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We analyze longitudinal data on British fertility clinics to examine the impact of “selection at the 
gate”, i.e. the attempts of organizations to improve the success rate of their output by selecting 
promising cases as input. In contrast to what might be expected, we argue that more stringent 
input selection is likely to lead to lower overt performance in comparison to those firms that admit 
difficult cases, because the latter develop steeper learning curves. That is, difficult cases enable 
more learning from prior experience, because they promote experimentation, communication 
amongst various actors, and the codification of new knowledge. Our results confirm this 
prediction and provide clear evidence that organizations with more difficult cases in their 
portfolios gradually begin to display performance figures that compare favorably to those firms 





League tables and rankings publicizing the quality of firms’ output are an important phenomenon 
in many industries. Business schools, law firms, medical clinics, etc. often publish their 
performance measurement in the public domain. However, the quality of an organization’s output 
is often substantially determined by the quality of its input. Consequently, often organizations can 
influence (or perhaps manipulate) their output by carefully selecting what sort of cases to admit as 
input. For example, business schools usually explicitly publicize the job offers and the career 
progress of their MBA graduates but they also use very stringent pre-selection criteria in terms of 
GMAT scores, interview performance, and work experience. Hence, the quality of their output 
may be the result of the quality of their educational program but equally might be determined by 
the quality of their selection program. This applies also to law firms that only take on winnable 
cases, workforce reintegration firms that help unemployed people to find jobs, and management 
consultants. For example, the business consulting firm Bain habitually and prominently publishes 
the market performance of its clients, claiming that they (Bain) “make companies more valuable” 
(Bain & Company, 2010), yet it usually only takes on companies whose financial performance 
already exceeds that of their peers. The same applies to the type of organizations we examine in 
this paper, IVF clinics. In various countries, the success rate of these fertility clinics, as 
percentages of pregnancies among admitted patients, is published annually. However, it is an open 
secret within the business that many clinics find ways to refuse patients with poor prognoses (The 
Lancet, 1999; BBC, 2007; Sharif and Afnan, 2003) – we refer to this as “selection at the gate”. 
Hence, IVF clinics can influence their output scores by carefully selecting their patients. 
 
So far, we know very little about the impact of these selection practices on the firms that use 
them. In this paper, we argue that the benefits of selection – in terms of heightened success rate 
for firms – might be short-lived. Building on organizational learning theory (Argote and Epple, 
1990; Argote, 1999; Haunschild and Sullivan, 2002) we argue that complex, “poor prognosis” 
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cases offer valuable opportunities for learning. Building on insights from extensive field work, we 
theorize that the knowledge and practices that organizations develop as a consequence of dealing 
with difficult cases, spill over and have a positive impact on the learning experiences of all cases. 
As a result, firms that deal with a relatively larger number of difficult cases develop steeper 
learning curves. In the case of the firms in our sample, their learning curves were so much steeper 
that, in time, those companies willing to take on difficult cases “caught up” with the firms that 
operated more stringent selection. Consequently, the overt success rates of the relatively inclusive 
firms ended up being higher than the rates achieved by those firms that had selected out the more 
difficult cases. Put differently, organizations that sought to increase their success rate through 
selection at the gate “shot themselves in the foot”. 
 
Our paper makes four contributions to the literature. First, we provide insights on and a systematic 
analysis of the important societal phenomenon of selection at the gate. Second, we contribute to 
theory on organizational learning. Research on organizational learning has documented learning 
curves for various industries (e.g. Argote, Beckman, Epple, 1990; Darr, Argote, Epple, 1995; 
Dutton and Thomas, 1984; Mihm et al., 2003), it has transferred this analysis from studying 
production processes to more complex experiences such as acquisitions (Haleblian and 
Finkelstein, 1999; Vermeulen and Barkema, 2001; Hayward, 2002) and alliances (Barkema et al., 
1997; Hoang and Rothaermel, 2005), and it has begun to study what types of experiences are most 
beneficial for firms (Haunschild and Sullivan, 2002; Schilling et al., 2003). We contribute to this 
line of research by explicitly examining an important moderator at firm level, i.e. the composition 
of the firm’s portfolio in terms of the complexity of its cases. Hence, we reveal one reason why 
some firms learn quicker than others – a topic relatively unexplored in this literature.  
 
The third contribution of this paper is that our findings on selection at the gate have broader 
implications. Firms face various pressures and temptations to optimize short-term results, yet, 
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these actions may sometimes come at the expense of long-term benefits. For example, various 
management practices and choices, varying from the adoption of a process management system 
(Benner and Tushman, 2002; 2003), to downsizing programs (Guthrie and Datta, 2008), or 
outsourcing (Reitzig and Wagner, 2010), may boost short-term performance but have longer-term 
negative consequences for firm’s performance. The choice of some IVF clinics to turn away 
difficult cases has similar ramifications; although at first sight some cases may seem less 
attractive and less profitable, their spill-over benefits could still make them profitable elements in 
the firm’s portfolio. Our study shows that it is important to take account of these indirect, long-
term benefits. 
 
The final contribution of this paper is an empirical one. One of the problems related to the type of 
topic addressed in this paper is the potentially confounding effect of reverse causality; some 
organizations (e.g. IVF clinics) might not be improving because they are dealing with many 
difficult cases; instead, because they are better, they are attracting more challenging cases. For 
example, the cancer units in very reputable institutions often display higher mortality rates 
because patients with the most complex etiology (and hence the lowest ex-ante probability of 
survival) find their way to or are referred to the best hospitals. We are fortunate that the IVF data 
we use for this study allow us to test directly for reverse causality, due to the presence of a control 
group. About half of the IVF clinics in the sample are National Health Service (NHS) clinics: i.e. 
government hospitals. These clinics do not select at the gate; 1 their patients are assigned 
randomly (i.e. by postal code). Nevertheless, this assignment process results in some NHS clinics 
receiving very few poor prognosis patients and others receiving relatively many.2 This enables us 
to test for – and rule out – the presence of reverse causality.  
 
We test our prediction – that the learning curve is less steep for firms that perform relatively few 
difficult cases – through three variables: 1) the proportion of women with a relatively poor 
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prognosis because they have failed to conceive through previous IVF treatment; 2) the proportion 
of women with a relatively poor prognosis because they produce very few eggs; and 3) women 
who are aged 35 years or over (35 is the industry’s standard cut-off rate), all categories known to 
have significantly lower chances of conceiving. All three variables support the study’s prediction: 
their presence moderates the organization’s learning curve so that firms that took on more difficult 
cases improved their success rate quicker.  
 
THEORY 
Experience and Learning 
The literature on organizational learning includes several strands (Argote and Ingram, 2000). One 
tradition – pertaining to the study of learning curves – examines the relationship between 
cumulative experience and performance. It interprets a positive association as evidence that 
learning has taken place, but it treats the process and content of knowledge accumulation as a 
black box. In these studies, organizational learning refers to gradual improvements, for instance in 
the form of efficiency increases, as the firm gains more experience with a particular process. 
Learning is seen as occurring iteratively as firms engage repeatedly in an activity, draw inferences 
from their experience, and store and then retrieve the learning through future engagement in the 
activity (Argote and Ophir, 2002; Levitt and March, 1988). Learning from experience may result 
in reduced production inputs (Dutton and Thomas, 1984; Mihm, Loch, and Huchzermeier, 2003), 
reduced unit costs (Argote and Epple, 1990), improved completion times (Edmondson et al., 
2001; Pisano et al., 2001; Reagans et al., 2005), acquisition efficiencies (Haleblian and 
Finkelstein, 1999; Hayward, 2002), and higher survival rates (Barkema et al., 1997; Ingram and 
Baum, 1997; Kim and Miner, 2000; Vermeulen and Barkema, 2001).  
 
Our study follows this tradition. We will measure whether the success rate of IVF clinics  
increases with experience. “Success” in this line of business (IVF clinics) is very clearly defined: 
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an IVF treatment that results in a birth is a success; and otherwise it is a failure. Hence, in our 
analysis, the measure of an organization’s success rates is the proportion of live births in the 
patients receiving IVF treatment. Experience concerns the cumulative number of IVF treatments 
performed by the organizatio. Specifically, we will examine whether the success rate of these 
organizations increases more or less quickly dependent on the proportion of difficult cases that 
they treat.  
 
The Process of Learning 
Studies examining the process of learning represent another strand in the organizational learning 
literature. The learning process is often seen as consisting of multiple, interdependent stages 
representing the search for, choice and implementation of solutions. This notion has led several 
authors to describe it as a cycle of activities engaged in by an organization to process knowledge 
that allows it to adapt and improve (Argyris and Schön, 1978; Kolb, 1984; Edmondson, 1999; 
Gibson and Vermeulen, 2003). For example, in the context of team learning, Gibson and 
Vermeulen (2003) describe the process as a cycle of experimentation, reflective communication, 
and knowledge codification. Similarly, we see the process of organizational learning as a cycle 
consisting of three subprocesses: experimentation, reflection and coordination, and capturing the 
newly acquired knowledge in the form of routines, technologies, and procedures.  
 
First, individuals within the organization need to generate ideas about how to improve work 
through exploration or experimentation (Argyris, 1976; Levitt and March, 1988; March, 1991). 
They need to try out new things, which leads them to accumulate new knowledge (Zollo and 
Winter, 2002). This concerns the process that Prencipe and Tell (2001) refer to as learning by 
using and doing. Second, a common understanding about a proposed solution must be developed. 
Organizational members’ engagement in experimentation can result in different mental schemas 
related to the experience. To reach a common understanding of what the experience or 
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information means, members transfer and combine their insights through a process of reflection 
and coordination (Jelinek, 1979; Walsh et al., 1988). This leads to the articulation of knowledge 
(Zollo and Winter, 2002), which is described by Prencipe and Tell (2001) as learning by 
reflecting, thinking, discussing, and confronting. Finally, the knowledge needs to be translated 
and codified (Zollo and Winter, 2002) into tangible, generalized concepts, decisions, or work 
methods (Argyris and Schön, 1978; Kolb, 1984); what Prencipe and Tell (2002) refer to as 
“learning by adapting, implementing, and replicating”.  
 
In combination, these processes form the learning cycle (Gibson and Vermeulen, 2003). We posit 
that dealing with difficult cases enhances this cycle. Analyzing airlines’ learning from accidents 
involving heterogeneous causes, Haunschild and Sullivan (2002) argued that it caused 
organizations to look for connections between different elements of a problem to deal with a 
complexity of multiple underlying causes (rather than attributing it to one relatively simple cause), 
and generate debate among actors, which leads to a richer understanding of the problem. 
Similarly, we argue that dealing with non-standard, difficult cases will force organizations and the 
people involved in the cases to conduct a deeper analysis of the underlying structure of a problem, 
enhancing their understanding of the issue and changing how they deal with and respond to prior 
experience.  
   
Hypothesis Development 
When a firm, such as a medical clinic, admits and begins to work with a relatively difficult case, it 
will often need to depart from existing routines and protocols. The standardized approaches may 
not work given the complex characteristics of the new case. This will necessitate and trigger 
experimentation, from which may emerge new solutions, deeper insights, and different ways of 
working across the organization. Experimentation can increase the skill levels of the individuals 
involved. Working with challenging cases enables additional practice, and allows those involved 
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to apply and evaluate novel solutions which otherwise might not have been considered. Evidence 
from human information processing suggests that task complexity requires the learner to generate 
a more elaborate mental model (Wilson and Rutherford, 1989) and enhances the ability to carry an 
increased cognitive load (Bannert, 2002; Sweller, 1989). Subsequent experience with more 
standard cases will be viewed in a new, more comprehensive light, with a better understanding of 
what Haunschild and Sullivan called “the underlying structure of the problem” (2002, p. 614). 
Thus, when organizations employ less stringent selection at the gate, novel challenges and 
opportunities are more likely to be encountered. As a consequence, the firm’s general competence 
to address new cases will increase with each unfamiliar case. In contrast, dealing with standard 
cases only will not lead to a richer understanding, and might even demotivate actors to try out new 
solutions. 
 
Some of the clinics where we conducted in-depth interviews for this project seemed deliberately 
to use complex cases for training purposes – see Table 1 for quotes. These difficult cases were 
introduced to entice people to experience new situations and new ways of doing things. Hence, 
dealing with complex cases enhances the general ability and skill levels of the people involved 
and leads to a deeper understanding, which promotes the development of new solutions. These 
new solutions may also improve success rates among more simple cases. For example, one 
physician commented:  
What you see in the textbook or in the code of practice are treatment coordinates for 
standard cases, the typical patients showing up for consultation, young couples under 35, 
with good egg reserve, good sperm and good health … We have a lot of experience with 
them and they’re easy cases where we rarely deviate from the standard procedure. And 
that’s all fine, but when you get a difficult case, with complex pathology, and the standard 
procedure simply doesn’t fit, what do you do? You change the practice, you start tinkering 
with the parameters, adding new things, adjusting doses and sequences so that it fits. And 
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is that all? No, it isn’t; you start tinkering with the procedure for the easy case as well; you 
take what you’ve learned from that difficult case to the easy case.  
 
As this and other interview extracts (see Table 1) suggest, finding solutions to difficult cases 
prevents the firm from inertia and over-reliance on a standard set of operating procedures. It 
motivates them to experiment to try to enhance overall performance. Haunschild and Sullivan 
(2002) suggest that the attention of the organizational members involved in dealing with a 
complex problem forces situational analyses which may go beyond simple responses, and leads to 
deeper analysis of the situation at hand. This is in line with Ocasio’s (1997) principle of situated 
attention, which emphasizes that ventures that require greater attention represent greater cognitive 
resources and higher levels of concern and participation from the organizational members 
involved. The experimentation triggered by experience of complex cases leads to learning effects 
that are beneficial to the execution of simpler cases. Subsequent experiences are evaluated on the 
basis of the new cognitive model and set of solutions.  
----- Insert Table 1 about here ----- 
 
Difficult cases also stimulate learning by heightening interaction among the various parties in an 
organization that contribute to the problem solving – the second part of the learning cycle. 
Because such cases necessitate a departure from standard procedures, this requires the 
organizational members to communicate and coordinate with one another. In the context of 
standard cases, coordination is achieved through adherence to established routines and 
procedures. Non-standard cases force people to interact directly. Increased levels of coordination 
will uncover problems in standard cases, fine-tune solutions, and aid the transfer of knowledge 
and routines (see also Hargadon and Sutton, 1997; Henderson and Cockburn, 1996). One 
physician summarized it thus:  
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Clinics which admit more difficult cases tend to be more disciplined and more thorough in 
their work. And of course, even for us, the effort of treating [difficult patients] intensifies 
the interaction among our doctors, embryologists, and nurses. And we tend to take that 
with us, and to do it for the next patient which enters our office. 
More direct communication also aids the processes of sensemaking (Weick et al., 2005), from 
which standard cases also benefit. It triggers collective reflection on how to deal with the problem 
at hand.  
 
Finally, the newly developed insights and solutions need to be translated into formal and informal 
processes, in the form of procedures, technologies, and routines – the third stage in the learning 
process. Methods and procedures developed under difficult circumstances trying to solve complex 
problems, may improve performance standard cases. In an experiment, Schilling and colleagues 
(2003), for example, found that experience gained in one setting benefited learning in a related 
context. Similarly,Wiersma (2007) found that performing a diversity of related tasks enabled 
organizations to learn quicker. Both studies concluded that variation in related tasks leads to a 
deeper cognitive understanding of the underlying processes, which allows for easier transfer of 
solutions. Our interviewees contended similarly that protocols, checklists, technological devices, 
and informal procedures developed when dealing with complex cases were often transferred to 
and applied to standard cases. For example, one executive – a quality manager – commented that:  
Doctors have checklists; the more difficult their cases, the longer the checklists. And I am 
interested in their checklists because I want to revise mine and bring the system up to date. 
Are we getting cases with a new bullet point? Then I want to know about it, the other 
doctors want to know about it, the nurses as well.  
 
To conclude, experience of difficult cases enhances learning in the organization. First, the 
experience triggers experimentation. Because complex cases imply a departure from established 
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procedures and routines, they force people to communicate and reflect on the newly developed 
solutions. Finally, the experience and learning lead to the codification of new knowledge in terms 
of newly adapted processes, routines, and technologies. Consequently, we predict that the learning 
curves observed in the firms in our sample will be steeper among organizations with relatively 
high proportions of difficult cases. Formally: 
Hypothesis: The relation between experience and success will be more positive for 
organizations with a higher proportion of difficult cases.  
 
This means that organizations that select heavily at the gate, and therefore deal with fewer 
difficult cases, miss out on learning benefits. They are less likely to depart from standard 
procedures, which leads to less experimentation, lower levels of interaction, and less new 
knowledge codification. As a result, these firms learn more slowly than organizations that apply 
less stringent selection criteria. Firms that admit a relatively high proportion of complex cases, 
initially will likely show lower success rates. However, if, as we predict, their rate of learning is 
indeed substantially higher than that of firms that select heavily at the gate, the learning curves 
could eventually cross, and firms with a higher share of difficult cases will begin to show 
comparatively higher success rates. In our models, we test for this possibility directly. 
 
METHOD 
Research Setting and Data 
The first in-vitro fertilization (IVF) baby was born in 1978 as the result of the work of two British 
scientists, Robert Edwards and Patrick Steptoe (1980). Yet, it was not until 1992 that the 
regulators in the United Kingdom permitted fertility centers to offer IVF treatment. Since then, 
data on all UK IVF centers have been collected and published by the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Authority (HFEA), which is the independent regulator that oversees the use of 
gametes and embryos in infertility treatment and research in the UK. With the HFEA’s 
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permission, we were able to trace back data on variables such as experience and success for the 
population of all fertility clinics based in the UK since 1991; the year prior to the introduction of 
IVF as an authorized treatment and up to 2006 (the final year made available). In addition, we had 
a total of 32 face-to-face interviews with people in the industry to supplement our quantitative 
analysis; 10 of which were conducted after completing the first draft of this manuscript. 
 
Of all IVF clinics in the UK, more than two thirds are private, usually owned by the doctors 
operating them, with the remainder being state-owned (i.e. National Health Service). For the 
former, as one respondent put it, “there is fierce competition between clinics”. Patients can choose 
at which clinic they want to buy treatment and, when doing so, many of them pay careful attention 
to the Patients’ Guide published by the HFEA (2002). This annual guide lists the clinical results 
for each IVF clinic in the country. This league table – as it is generally referred to in the industry 
– assures that all clinic success rates are publicly available and easy to access. For example, in 
2010, during which 45,264 patients received IVF treatment in the UK, the relevant website 
received more than 600,000 hits.  
 
Table 2 comprises a number of interview quotes regarding the roles of the league table and 
selection at the gate. The quotes illustrate that the existence of the league table puts pressure on 
the clinics to present good success rates. It  stimulates them to select patients with ex-ante higher 
chances of success (The Lancet, 1999; BBC, 2007; Sharif and Afnan, 2003). As one respondent 
put it, “The best way to move yourself up the table is to treat prognostically the better group of 
patients”. Interviewees also indicated that clinics do this to a more or lesser extent; some are very 
selective where others are much less restrictive.  




For a variety of reseason, this setting and these data are ideal for testing the relationship between 
experience and success. First, because the measure of success is unambiguous: whether a cycle of 
IVF treatment results in a live birth or not is a clear goal and outcome. Furthermore, because each 
patient and treatment cycle is distinct, cumulative experience is clearly measurable and simple to 
operationalize, namely as the prior number of treatments performed. Moreover, there are some 
clear indicators as to whether a patient should be classed as a “difficult case” or not, based on 
poor prognosis, prior failure to conceive, or age. The database we constructed is very 
comprehensive. There were only 11 left-censored observations, which gives us complete 
longitudinal data on 90 percent of the clinics in the population, and hence complete data on their 
prior experience. We re-ran the analyses excluding the left-censored observations and this did not 
change any of the results. Finally, because around one third of the clinics in the sample are 
government hospitals (which do not select at the gate) we have a valuable control group to rule 
out some possible alternative explanations (e.g. reverse causality). 
 
During the period 1991-2006, a total of 116 IVF clinics were set up; by the end of our sample 
period, 100 of these had more than 2 years of data, with the average 9.3 years of observation per 
clinic. The oldest clinics had been offering IVF for 15 years, the newest for just 1 year. The 
largest clinic had treated over 13,000 patients during the window of observation, while the 
average number of prior cases was approximately 4,000 patients. In total, these clinics have 
performed over 400,000 IVF cycles on around 300,000 women, who had delivered over 75,000 
IVF babies by the end of 2006. 
 
Dependent Variable  
Success rate. In the Patients’ Guide, success rates are presented separately for patients in six age 
groups: under 35, 35-37, 38-39, 40-42, and over 43 years. Patients under 35 - and by far the 
largest group - are generally regarded in the industry to be the “standard patient group” (Johnson 
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et al., 2007), and used as the primary basis for comparisons between clinics because it “reduce[s] 
the impact of ‘patient-mix’ on the comparability of results between different centres” (Sharif and 
Afnan, 2003: 484). In light of these field observations, our primary dependent variable is the 
success rate in standard cases, defined as the live-birth rate in the IVF patient group aged under 
35, involving the use of the patient’s own fresh eggs. It is calculated as the number of live-birth 
events per number of female patients under 35 who underwent one or more fresh IVF cycles in 
the year of observation. We chose standard cases (i.e. women < 35) as the dependent variable, 
rather than the success rate among women of all ages, because this is the information that is made 
public and hence informs (potential) patients when choosing a clinic. Repeating the analysis using 
the success rate across all cases (i.e. women of all ages) led to basically the same results as those 
displayed in Table 4. 
 
Independent Variables 
Prior experience. Experience was measured by cumulating all the prior cases that involved one or 
more IVF cycles using the patient’s own fresh eggs. The number of patients treated by each clinic 
in a given year is not published in the Patients’ Guide; it was provided directly from the HFEA. In 
line with prior research (e.g. Argote, 1999), we computed the natural log of experience. This 
assumes, for example, that the experiential difference between 100 and 200 cases is more 
influential than the difference between 10,000 and 10,100 cases.  
 
To measure the level of difficulty in a clinic’s patient mix, we identified three factors which IVF 
practitioners regard as relevant dimensions for assessing the complexity of a case: patients over 35 
years old, patients that have failed to conceive with previous IVF treatment, and patients who 
produce very few eggs. All three categories are considered to represent more difficult cases with 




Patients aged over 35. In the field of IVF, the variable patients over the age of 35 is generally 
considered the main predictor of success, since increasing age of the female reproductive system 
generally reduces the chance of successful pregnancy. Thirty-five years is used as the standard 
cut-off rate in the field because at around that age female fertility shows a rapid decline. Figure 1 
shows that the success rate for IVF cycles is relatively stable up to the age of 35, but shows a 
sharp decline thereafter. So women aged under 35 are considered standard cases, and patients 
aged over 35 are seen as more difficult cases. One of our interviewees told us that: “Age is the 
most important parameter, [and] the only thing that we know and that is true beyond any scientific 
doubt is that increasing age equals more difficult cases and poorer outcomes”.3 We computed the 
proportion of older patients as the ratio of the number of IVF patients over the age of 35, to the 
total number of IVF patients treated each year by each clinic.  
----- Insert Figure 1 about here ----- 
 
Patients with a history of prior failed treatment. The second variable used to measure relatively 
poor prognosis cases is number of patients where previous treatment has failed. A history of prior 
IVF failure can signal a possible problematic underlying etiology. Patients who have had a 
previous IVF treatment and failed to conceive may have health conditions that require further 
investigation and intervention, or may have a tolerance to the standard drugs. As one respondent 
put it, “[a] factor that affects IVF success rate [is], for example, how many times has the patient 
attempted IVF in the past”. Of course, not all patients who fail to conceive following an IVF 
treatment will have a particularly complex or problematic etiology; in some cases, the failure may 
be sheer chance. And vice versa, some patients with poor prognoses may get pregnant after the 
first treatment. However, if we measure all of a clinic’s patients experiencing previous treatment 
failure and compare with successful conceptions at first treatment, on average, the former group 
can be expected to include a significantly higher proportion of complex cases. We build on this 
information in the analysis. We proxy the proportion of patients who have received more than one 
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IVF cycle by dividing the total number of IVF cycles by the total number of IVF patients treated 
at a clinic, in the same year of observation.  
 
Proportion of patients with low egg reserve. The last indicator of a difficult case builds on a 
patient’s ovarian reserve; the number of oocytes (eggs) that can be retrieved from a woman’s 
ovaries and fertilized, as an early indication of the likely outcome of the treatment. Clinics can 
choose to measure this before commencing treatment, as explained by one of our respondents: 
“They'll usually run a panel of hormones to get an idea of what they call ovarian reserve, in other 
words, does the ovary still have plenty of eggs”. Practitioners tend to be more optimistic about 
patients with higher egg and embryo counts because a larger number of retrieved oocytes 
increases the probability of achieving valid embryos, from which to select the best candidates for 
transfer into the patient’s womb. For these patients, the excess eggs or embryos are cryopreserved 
in case subsequent frozen cycles are necessary.4 If there are no excess embryos that can be frozen, 
this is seen as indicative of an underlying, problematic etiology. Therefore, the number of frozen 
cycles relative to the number of fresh IVF cycles performed at a clinic is treated by sector analysts 
as indicative of the proportion of “good prognosis patients” in the clinic’s patient mix (Abdalla, 
2008).5 The more the number of frozen cycles performed at a clinic relative to the number of fresh 
IVF cycles, the higher the incidence of good prognosis cases among its patients. To make the 
interpretation of this ratio consistent with the hypothesis in our study – which refers to the effort 
expended by clinics to handle more demanding cases – we reverse-coded this ratio to obtain a 
proxy for the number of poor prognosis patients.  
 
High proportions of each of these three patient groups pose challenges to clinics in the sense that 
there are more elements that must be addressed at each stage in the treatment. For example, with 
increasing age, the woman’s reproductive system generally exhibits more constraints to successful 
pregnancy: the pituitary and thyroid functions deteriorate; the shapes of the ovaries and uterus 
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change which affects their function; the body’s neurotransmitters become less responsive; the 
morphology of the human gametes changes, etc. These elements and their complex relation to 
each other require additional procedures in the treatment cycle (e.g., customization of the 
hormonal doses in order to insure ovarian response; micro-manipulation procedures performed in 
the lab to ensure fertilization and/or selection of morphologically normal sperm, eggs, or embryos, 
etc.). Similarly, for patients who have experienced a failed previous cycle and for patients with 
lower egg counts, treatment cycles tend to involve more task elements in order to address the 
medical complications of having a recent failure, or a low egg count. For these patients, clinics 
cannot rely on the standard treatment protocol only. 
 
Control variables. We control for clinic size using a commonly accepted measure of clinic 
capacity, i.e. the count of all licensed treatments (including IVF cycles, donor insemination, 
frozen cycles, and cycles involving donated eggs and embryos) performed at each clinic in the 
previous year. We include the square term of clinic size because prior research suggests that the 
effect might be non-linear (e.g. Haveman, 1993). We use a dummy variable to control for whether 
the clinic has ICSI (intra-cytoplasmic sperm injection) technology available. ICSI is an innovation 
that was introduced in the IVF industry during our period of observation. ICSI enables 
embryologists to address the problem of low sperm count or poor sperm mobility, by injecting a 
single sperm into the ovum. This makes a significant difference even for couples where male 
infertility is not an issue because it leaves less to chance (Takeuchi et al., 2000). At the beginning 
of our observation period there were no clinics with ICSI; at the end of the observation period all 
clinics were using ICSI, but not all clinics gained access to this technology at the same time. We 
control for this using a time-variant variable.  
 
We control also for the industry experience in the field of IVF. The average success rate of IVF 
across all clinics has increased over the years. Hence, a clinic established, for example, 2005 is 
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likely to enjoy a higher immediate success rate than a clinic established at the first year of entry in 
1995, purely because the field as a whole has progressed. Firms learn from the experience of 
others (Argote et al., 1990; Ingram and Baum, 1997), through medical training, employee 
mobility, conferences, and so forth. Therefore, we control for total industry experience, measured 
as the natural logarithm of the count of all IVF cycles performed in the UK up to the year of 
observation. As an alternative, we re-ran the models controlling for the highest clinic-level 
success rate achieved for the standard patient group in each given year, to indicate the “state-of-
the-art” in the field. Both measures led to identical results. We present the models with total 
industry experience. Finally, all our models include fixed-effects (i.e. they include clinic 
dummies), representing a shift in the intercept of a firm’s learning curve, to control for any 
remaining unobserved clinic-specific characteristics that may affect clinical performance.  
 
Analysis 
We ran various estimators to check the robustness of our models. Below, we present the results of 
the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator with fixed effects (within and between). Models using 
a random-effects estimator produced nearly identical results. Also, because our dependent 
variable is a proportion (proportion of patients giving birth), it is bounded between 0 and 1, 
whereas the predicted values of an OLS model cannot be guaranteed to lie within this interval. To 
correct for this, Papke and Wooldridge (1996) proposed the fractional logit estimator, which they 
later expanded for use with panel data (Papke and Wooldridge, 2008). This estimator produces 
very similar results to those displayed below, although our second test (patients with previous 
failed treatment) only supports our hypothesis at p < .10. In the remainder of the paper, we present 
and discuss the results of the fixed effects OLS regression because it is easier to interpret the size 





Table 2 presents summary statistics for the variables included in our models. One thing to note is 
the fairly low or even negative correlations between the three indicators of difficult patients. We 
conducted some further analysis and interviews to understand the background to this. One reason 
for the relatively low correlations, specifically between patients who failed before and patients 
who produce few eggs (.19), is simply that not all clinics deliberately select at the gate. Indeed, 
for the subsample of private clinics, which at least have the possibility to select their patients (the 
NHS clinics did not differentially select at the gate) the correlation is already higher (.23).  
 
Furthermore, the variable patients above the age of 35 differs from the other two due to clinic 
location. We took each of the three difficulty indicators as dependent variables in a simple 
regression model (with fixed effects) with GDP per capita for the specific area in which the clinic 
is located as the explanatory variable (representing 185 different areas within the UK). The results 
showed that local GDP per capita was significantly negatively associated with patients who failed 
before (-.48; p<.01) and patients who produce few eggs (-1.51; p<.001), but significantly 
positively with patients above 35 (2.76; p<.001). The likely reason for this is that in relatively 
socially deprived areas (i.e. with lower GDP per capita) there are more patients with a difficult 
underlying etiology, for instance due to a higher incidence of sexually transmitted diseases. In 
contrast, in more wealthy areas, patients tend to be older when trying to conceive. When assessed 
across clinics, this leads to a low or even negative correlation between the first two measures and 
patients above 35.  
----- Insert Table 3 about here ----- 
 
In conformity with the abovementioned findings, we also ran an exploratory factor analysis (using 
principal components with varimax rotation), which showed that patients who have failed before 
and patients with few eggs load on the same factor (with factor loadings .74 and .76 respectively). 
Yet, the second factor was comprised solely of patients above 35 (.89). Nevertheless, a combined 
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measure of difficult patients, constructed by standardizing and averaging the three individual 
indicators, led to the exact same results and conclusions as discussed below.  
 
Table 4 displays the results of the regression analyses. The first column refers to the model with 
control variables only. The results show that, in general, if clinics grow larger their success rate 
increases. The quadratic effect of size is negative but because the overall relationship between 
size and success only turns negative at +1.35 standard deviations above the mean, the estimations 
suggest that clinic size might have a negative influence on the success rate only when clinics 
become very large. The effect of size is modest, but significant. For example, if the size of the 
average clinic increases by one standard deviation (i.e. from 457 to 891 treatments per year), the 
probability of a patient becoming pregnant at that clinic increases by 2%. The other two control 
variables show the expected effects. The use of the innovative ICSI technology increases success 
rates by about 4-5%. Overall industry experience – as a proxy for overall progress in the field – is 
also positive and significant. 
----- Insert Table 4 about here ----- 
 
Testing the Hypothesis 
Models 2-5 present the estimates of our three measures of difficult cases (age, prior failure, 
patients producing very few eggs) and their interaction with clinic experience. In all three cases 
the interaction is positive and significant. This indicates that the positive relationship between 
clinic experience and success is stronger for clinics that deal with the more difficult cases. Hence, 
all three tests strongly support our hypothesis: clinics that deal with a larger proportion of poor 
prognosis patients show steeper learning curves.  
 
Note that the three main effects concerning difficult patients in these models are negative, as 
expected. This means that, by itself, taking on a higher proportion of complex cases depresses a 
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clinic’s success rate, because dealing with many poor prognosis patients initially decreases the 
number of pregnancies resulting from the treatment.6 However, because of the learning effects 
they entail clinics that admit more difficult cases show an increase in their success rates faster 
than clinics that are more selective over their admissions.  
 
Figure 2 displays the estimated relationship between clinic experience and success rate. Using the 
results from model 5, keeping all other variables at their mean, we display the relationship 
between experience and success for a clinic where all three indicators are at one standard 
deviation below their mean (i.e. a clinic dealing with a low proportion of difficult cases), versus 
when all three indicators are at one standard deviation above their mean (i.e. one with a high 
proportion of difficult cases). Accordingly, the former is labeled “low selection at the gate”, 
where the other is labeled “high selection at the gate”. The results show clearly that treating 
difficult cases has an initially depressing effect on a clinic’s success rate; a clinic that admits more 
difficult cases has a success rate as much as 10% lower than clinics that mainly select more 
promising cases. However, as the graphs show, these clinics start to catch up rapidly. After about 
a 100 cases their success rate is already equal to that of the clinics that do select heavily at the 
gate.7 Subsequently, they their success rates improve at a faster rate than those of their 
counterparts; after 400 cases, their overt success rate is 3.3% higher than the clinics that deal with 
few difficult patients.  
----- Insert Figure 2 about here ----- 
 
Alternative Explanations and Additional Analysis  
Reverse causality. We tested whether the results presented above could potentially be confounded 
by some reverse causality. This is pertinent because it seems possible that (prospective) patients 
with a relatively poor prognosis, who can access and observe the various clinics performance 
indicators (which are published), might be more inclined to select and visit a clinic with a higher 
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overall success rate. Or, similarly, that the clinics that are improving rapidly will start to attract 
more difficult cases. Hence, it might be that clinics with higher (ex-ante) success rates attract 
more difficult cases, rather than the other way around. To test for this possible effect directly, we 
estimated our models on the subsample of NHS clinics only. These state-owned clinics cannot 
select at the gate; they are obliged to admit all the patients that are assigned to them. As one 
doctor working in an NHS center explained:  
I can’t pick and choose here at all. I have to see everyone who comes to the door… I can’t 
turn down someone who has bad endometriosis or poor egg reserve, I can’t say ‘sorry I 
can’t treat you’ because it’s their right, they’re NHS. In a private clinic I can, oh yes. I can 
tell them ‘look, I don’t want to include you in my statistics.’ […] There is much more 
independence as to what some doctors can do in other clinics.”  
Patients also cannot select among NHS clinics; they are assigned to a particular clinic based on 
their home address/postal code. Therefore, because poor prognosis patients cannot choose clinics 
with higher success rates, there is no possibility of a reverse causality effect. 
 
However, some NHS clinics deal with a substantially higher number of difficult cases than others, 
due to chance but also because particular areas/postal codes are associated with more complex 
pathologies (e.g. inner-city areas). For example, one of the doctors working in an inner-city clinic, 
who previously had worked in a clinic in a wealthy provincial area, commented:  
There I had mostly Caucasian patients, with less health issues than our patients here in 
[East London], where I see much more Africans than I ever saw in [Yorkshire]… Also 
patients from the young urban population here are more likely to have pelvic infections 
not using condoms, having unprotected sex, are more likely to get Chlamydia and all 




Hence, although not caused by selection at the gate, some NHS clinics deal with larger 
proportions of more difficult cases, but there is no chance of reverse causality. If our 
organizational learning theory holds, these clinics should also display steeper learning curves than 
their NHS counterparts that deal with relatively few difficult cases. This enables us to check 
whether our findings might be confounded by reverse causality issues. 
 
Our longitudinal data include 39 NHS clinics, together accounting for 406 clinic-year 
observations. We estimated the effect of our three predictors on the success rates of these clinics 
using the models displayed in Table 3. In spite of the smaller sample size, the coefficients of all 
three predicted interactions confirm our hypothesis (patients above 35 = .0444, p<.05; prior 
failure = .0371, p<.10; poor egg reserve = .0096, p<.05); the results are very close to the results 
based on the full sample. To conclude, reverse causality does not explain our findings, which still 
fully support the prediction in this paper. 
 
Additional specialists. Another alternative explanation could be that clinics that treat a larger 
proportion of difficult patients, over time, add more specialists to their personnel to accommodate 
those patients. The presence of these specialists might potentially also start to benefit standard 
cases, which could explain our results. To test for this possibility, we contacted the HFEA, who 
do regular (although not yearly) inspections of all clinics, among others collecting data on the 
number of specialist roles. Hence, we were able to collect data on the number of specialists for 
606 year-clinic observations (out of a total of 1004), representing 85 different clinics. Using the 
number of specialists as a dependent variable, including the same independent variables as in all 
other models, we tested directly whether clinics that treat more difficult patients create more 
specialist positions. Although industry experience significantly predicted the number of specialists 
in a clinic (6.26, p<.001; which indicates that with progression in the field more specialist roles 
were developed), and ICSI technology drove the number of specialist down (-1.56, p<.001; 
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probably because ICSI replaced several other specialist roles), our three indicators of difficult 
cases, whether measured as a proportion or in interaction with cumulative experience, remained 
wholly insignificant in all models. This shows that clinics that deal with a relatively large number 
of difficult cases do not add more specialists to their team than others. Hence, this does not 
support the alternative explanation for our findings.8   
 
More technology. Similar to the previous point, one could conjecture that clinics that deal with 
more difficult patients also start to use the additional technology – in the form of equipment and 
specialist treatments – for standard cases, which could also benefit their success rate. This too 
could potentially drive our results. Although it is impossible to measure all technologies and 
specialist procedures, we were able to find a proxy in the form of ICSI treatment, specifically to 
what extent a clinic also started using ICSI for standard patients. ICSI is an expensive procedure 
that usually is only used for difficult patients with a particular set of fertility problems, yet some 
clinics have started to use it more widely. The HFEA provided us with data about how many ICSI 
treatments each of the clinics provided any given year. Since we already had information about 
how many difficult patients they treated, we were able to add a control to our models proxy’ing 
ICSI for standard patients. This measure remained completely insignificant in all models; 
apparently treating standard patients with ICSI does not improve their success rate. Importantly, 
all our results, as reported in Table 4, were fully replicated.  
 
Better learning environments. Another alternative explanation could be that some clinics form 
better learning environments, in the sense that they are motivated to push the frontier of 
knowledge about IVF, and are therefore inclined to accept a larger proportion of difficult patients. 
Yet, these attractive learning environments could also attract better doctors, which could in turn 
lead to a higher success rate. Although this alternative rationale should to a considerable extent be 
accounted for through our fixed effects models, we endeavored to test and control for it more 
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directly. First, we collected a dummy variable whether a clinic was affiliated with a university 
hospital, under the assumption that these are more interested to push knowledge development 
about IVF. This variable, however, appeared to be largely time-invariant, so that it was already 
controlled for – and thus dropped out – in our fixed effects models.9 Next, via the HFEA, we 
managed to collect data on the total number of research projects that each clinic was engaged in 
for every year, assuming that the more research-oriented clinics would represent a more 
interesting learning environment for ambitious doctors. The estimate of the variable itself, as well 
as of its interaction with cumulative clinic experience, was insignificant. Importantly, it did not 
reduce any of the support for our predictions. Apparently, engagement in research projects is not a 
substitute for experience, as it does not cause a clinic to learn quicker.10  
 
DISCUSSION 
We have shown that selection at the gate – organizations that try to enhance their explicit success 
rate by selecting promising cases as input – may eventually disadvantage the firms that engage in 
this practice. The British IVF clinics in our study that admitted few difficult cases initially 
enjoyed higher success, in the form of more live births per patient treated. However, this 
advantage disappeared quite quickly; because the clinics that treated relatively higher numbers of 
difficult cases learned quicker from their prior IVF experiences, the organizations that selected 
heavily at the gate ended up having significantly lower overt success rates than their more lenient 
counterparts. What initially seems an advantage, turned against the firm in the longer run; the 
clinics that selected heavily, eventually found themselves “on the back foot” in terms of their 
success rates. Although they were treating mainly patients with relatively simple etiologies, the 
number of live births per patient ended up being lower than in clinics treating more difficult cases.  
 
Our findings suggest that admitting and dealing with more difficult cases enhances learning 
because it requires organizations to depart from routine processes. Standard IVF treatment 
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consists of a series of routinized, sequential stages, which are guided by protocols. The various 
medical professionals conducting the different stages do not need to meet and communicate when 
they are following the established procedures. However, dealing with non-standard cases forces 
them to consider new solutions, establish new communication patterns, and alter their work 
methods. Our findings suggest that these new solutions and communication patterns influence the 
treatment of standard cases, which enhances their success rate.  
 
Implications 
This finding has implications for the literature on organizational learning, especially the tradition 
that examines the relation between cumulative experience and success. There has been much 
progress in terms of determining learning curves for various industries and processes (see, Argote, 
1999; Argote and Ingram, 2000). The studies in this tradition have begun to disentangle what 
underlies the transfer of knowledge (Argote and Ingram, 2000; Almeida and Kogut, 1999; 
Szulanski, 1996), to examine interorganizational learning (Argote and Ophir, 2002; Ingram and 
Baum, 1997) and the diversity and type of experiences that lead to learning (Tyre and Von Hippel, 
1997; Haunschild and Sullivan, 2002; Darr et al., 2005; Hoang and Rothearmel, 2005; Baum and 
Dahlin, 2007; Wiersma, 2007). However, relatively little is known about learning curve 
moderators, especially those under the control of the firm’s management.11 Hence, we provide 
greater insight into why certain strategic choices (e.g., the proportion of difficult products in a 
portfolio) enable some firms to learn quicker than others. 
 
The implications of our results, however, are much broader. They tie in with other studies that 
have theorized about how short term pressures may sometime tempt organizations to adopt 
choices that lead to suboptimal results in the long run. Benner and Tushman (2002; 2003), for 
example, showed how the adoption of a process management system, such as ISO9000, intended 
to boost quality and efficiency, may in the long run lead to a decline in firm innovation, which 
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could potentially offset these short-term benefits. Similarly, downsizing programs may cut costs 
and boost a firm’s short-term profits, but research by Guthrie and Datta (2008) indicated that 
firms are usually worse off in the long run, for instance due to lower commitment and increased 
turnover rates amongst the remaining employees (e.g. Trevor and Nyberg, 2008). Others studies 
document the unanticipated effects of discontinuing certain activities – for instance due to 
outsourcing – on the development of an organization’s capabilities (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; 
Macher and Boerner, 2006; Weigelt, 2009; Reitzig and Wagner, 2010). Our study provides 
another example that difficult activities, which seemingly are not attractive for firms to perform 
(e.g. due to low margins), can have indirect positive effects on an organization’s performance in 
the form of learning benefits, which can make their undertaking worthwhile.  
 
Limitations 
Our study points to trade-offs. The firms in our sample had to choose between boosting their 
success rate by selecting out difficult cases, and foregoing on the long-term learning benefits that 
they entail. However, there were several other costs that we did not observe. For example, we did 
not examine the full financial implications for the organizations in our sample of engaging in 
selection at the gate. Dealing with difficult cases requires resources. As one interviewee put it 
“complex cases are very time consuming”. Another one said, “they need more care, they need 
more counselling, they need more interventions, they need more monitoring”. On the other hand, 
prescreening patients, with the intention of selecting out the difficult ones, is also costly. As one 
interviewee, whose clinic did not select at the gate, explained: “They do more tests to exclude 
patients. We do very basic investigations. Other centers, they have heaps of tests done”. How 
these various costs and benefits compare could be a valuable subject of future research. We only 
studied organizational success in terms of live births but we do not know how such improvements 
influence overall profitability. Examining the trade-off between the various costs and learning 
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opportunities, and thus disentangling the different aspects of success, would lead to a more 
comprehensive understanding of the issue examined in this paper.  
 
Another question we did not explicitly examine in this paper is whether firms can also do too 
many difficult cases. It seems possible that if the learning benefits decrease, they no longer 
outweigh the costs involved. Or perhaps doing very large proportions of difficult cases even 
inhibits learning (cf. Haunschild and Sullivan, 2002). To get to this point to some extent, we ran 
additional models including squared terms of our three indicators of difficult cases, and also 
interacted them with clinic experience. Only in the case of patients who failed before did this lead 
to statistically significant results, both on the interaction with the main term (.064, p<.001) and the 
the interaction with its square (-.074, p<.001), suggesting seeing too many patients with prior 
failures starts to inhibit learning. Perhaps on the other two indicators, our clinics simply did not 
reach this point of saturation, but future research focusing explicitly on this topic might shed more 
light on the issue. It did again highlight an important nuance of our theory and empirical findings , 
namely that it is not simply that clinics learn from difficult cases – that would be a main effect – it 
is the combination of doing difficult cases and ample prior experience with standard cases that 
enhances an organization’s success rate. Put differently, clinics that dealt with a relatively large 
proportion of difficult cases, benefited more from their prior experience with standard cases than 
clinics that focused solely on this category.  
 
An important boundary condition of our study is that the “standard case” should still imply a 
reasonable level of difficulty. Settings where standard cases are very simple, with near perfect 
success rates, might not benefit from the learning opportunities offered by difficult cases, simply 
because there is not much left to learn. In contrast, even for standard IVF cases, for example, there 
is still ample room for improvement, since success rates are relatively low. Our findings and 
conclusions relate to such situations, where the more standard cases can potentially be improved 
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in terms of efficiency, error rates, or other indicators of success. It seems possible that, in such 
situations, some firms might opt to deliberately take on difficult cases to learn; for instance 
project-based organizations might seek challenging client problems in order to build new skills 
and knowledge (Prencipe and Tell, 2001). Future research might focus on examining such cases 
of deliberate learning.  
 
Following from the above, one could wonder whether clinics might be aware of the learning 
benefits difficult cases entail and, if so, to what extent they act upon it. Although we do not have 
any quantitative evidence on the issue, our interview data clearly suggested that although some 
practitioners recognize the learning benefits (as per Table 1), certainly not all of them do. Where 
there were a fair number of people who saw learning advantages, the majority of them did not. 
When we asked clinics with lenient selection criteria for the reason behind their policy, they never 
quoted learning benefits as a reason, but invariably focused on ethical considerations. As one 
interviewee put it, “There's a commercial pressure and there's an ethical commitment that struggle 
to always balance together”. The awareness of potential learning benefits that particular 
individuals displayed did not necessarily translate into awareness and admission policy at the 
clinic level. However, the clinics that admitted difficult cases – largely, as they claim, for ethical 
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How they enhance the 





Leads to improved skill 
levels in individuals 
One interviewee described that her clinic: “has a system in place for nurses and junior doctors, 
and the way this has been done seems to work better than giving them only easy jobs… For 
example, Gina has now received a case with poly-cystic ovarian syndrome, which is one of the 
toughest diagnostics to work with; all her previous patients were young, straightforward cases 
which responded well [to drugs]. She’s got the hang of it from those simple cases, but she needs 
the challenge to perfect her skill, to understand the various nuances and the subtleties of this job.” 
 
 What is learned from 
difficult cases aides the 
relatively simple cases  
A doctor explained: “What you see in the textbook or in the code of practice are treatment 
coordinates for standard cases, the typical patients showing up for consultation, young couples 
under 35, with good egg reserve, good sperm and good health… We have a lot of experience with 
them and they’re easy cases where we rarely deviate from the standard procedure. And that’s all 
fine, but when you get a difficult case, with complex pathology, and the standard procedure simply 
doesn’t fit, what do you do? You change the practice, you start tinkering with the parameters, 
adding new things, adjusting doses and sequences so that it fits. And is that all? No, it isn’t; you 
start tinkering with the procedure for the easy case as well; you take what you’ve learned from 
that difficult case to the easy case.” 
 
 Difficult cases deepen 
understanding 
One IVF consultant stated: “I think those difficult cases teach us much better how to do our job, 
how to understand the real depth of infertility as a medical condition, how to acknowledge our 
ignorance in order to overcome it. If you don’t let the bad cases in, to teach you failure, to teach 
you pressure, you’ll oversimplify, you’ll miss many of the underlying causes.” 
 
 Focuses attention and 
solution finding 
A doctor in a clinic that sees a high proportion of patients of advanced maternal age and thus lower 
chances of successful treatment, stated: “Treating older women who constantly remind their 
doctors that they are running out of time builds a feeling of urgency, a feeling of purpose in  all 




Difficult cases lead to new 
solutions and improve 
coordination 
“Clinics which admit more older women tend to be more experimental in the therapies that they 
offer. The effort of treating such patients –and patients with poor prognosis in general–intensifies 




 Improved coordination also 
aides the more simple cases  
“Clinics which admit more difficult cases tend to be more disciplined and more thorough in their 
work. And of course, even for us, the effort of treating [difficult patients] intensifies the interaction 
among our doctors, embryologists and nurses. And we tend to take that with us, and to do it for the 
next patient which enters our office.”   
 
 Reflection and interaction 
leads to enhanced 
understanding 
One of the doctors working at a clinic in London contrasted the its patient base to that of a clinic in 
which he had worked that was in a provincial area: “There I had mostly Caucasian patients, with 
less health issues than our patients here in [East London], where I  see much more Africans than I 
ever saw in [Yorkshire]… also patients from the young urban population here are more likely to 
have pelvic infections, not using condoms, having unprotected sex, are more likely to get 
Chlamydia and all those things with tubal problems… So I see more pathologies, more problems 
and so on… but all these problematic cases add to our experience as doctors, it makes us talk to 
embryologists, to pharmacists; it matures us, it keeps us understand things, the physiology of 
different races and diseases, how drugs work for them, what their medical predispositions are”. 
  
 They stimulate collective 
reflection and learning 
 
“If we have unusual cases or adverse outcomes, then we have regular clinical meetings, look at 
the cases, pull them to pieces and everybody tries to learn from those” 
The translation of 
what has been learned 
into processes and 
procedures 
Knowledge capture “It’s hard but treating severe cases comes with its rewards. I’m not talking only about the thrill of 
cracking a difficult case, I’m talking about the careful checklists that you put together and the 
resilience that you develop as you do that. Baby or no baby, the checklists and the ideas you tried 
stay with you, you’ll try them again for less complicated cases again and again. Anything that 
leaves less to chance is worth trying again”.   
  
 Knowledge capture and 
transfer 
Several interviewees referred to the updating of clinical protocols and departmental interfaces 
based on experience with difficult cases. A quality control manager described it thus: “Doctors 
have checklists; the more difficult their cases, the longer the checklists. And I am interested in 
their checklists because I want to revise mine and bring the system up to date. Are we getting cases 
with a new bullet point? Then I want to know about it, the other doctors want to know about it, the 
nurses as well.” 
 
 Knowledge capture in 
procedures and technology 
Interviewees gave numerous examples of spillovers from the more complex to the less problematic 




experienced doctor described how a catheter typically employed in difficult embryo transfers had 
become the tool of choice for most doctors in his clinic, regardless of the difficulty of the case: 
“Because we have experienced many two-stage transfers in older age groups, our medical director 
has authorized the purchase of several Wallace Pro-Ultra catheters. These catheters made the 
two-stage procedure so much easier under ultrasound, that most of us are using it now for the 
ordinary single-stage transfers.”  
 
 Knowledge transfer to 
relatively simple cases 
Another example of knowledge transfer from difficult to more straightforward cases was described 
by an embryologist related to involvement in a case with a history of treatment failure: “She had 
beautiful embryos, symmetrical, with equally sized blastomeres, perfect for textbook illustrations… 
we couldn’t understand why they didn’t implant… but then we did the PGD test and discovered 
chromosomal abnormalities in three of them… Now when I see perfectly symmetrical embryos I 




Table 2: Qualitative Evidence Regarding League Tables, Selection, and Difficult Patients  
Concept Interview quotes 
League 
tables 
Many interviewees commented that competition between clinics is fierce, and that the main variable of comparison is their success rate: 
“The pressure is mainly to ensure that the success rates are comparable with the natural success rates. That's the most importa nt thing. 
… showing that you've got good success rates. … Patients look at your success rate as your top -line”. 
 
“If one IVF clinic has a success rate 5% or 10% higher than another, patients will notice this and that will have a big commer cial effect 
on that clinic.  … To what extent they're truly comparable from one clinic to another is debatable, but, certainly, patients treat them as a 
league table”. 
 
“If you don't treat poor prognosis patients, then your pregnancy rate per age group will be better.  So, therefore, if you loo k at the league 
table publication by the HFEA, you will look better than a clinic which is just as good but who may treat poorer prognosis pa tients. You 
will appear higher in the league table, and therefore the interpretation of patients may be that [your clinic] is better”.  
 
“The best way to move yourself up the table is to treat prognostically the better group of patients.  If you have a group of p atients that are 
poor prognosis, if where you come in the league table is important to your practice, you will no t give those patients a chance. So, patient 
selection is critical”. 
 
Selection 
at the gate 
When asked why some clinics seem to select out difficult patients, one doctor, heading an Academic Unit of Reproductive and 
Developmental Medicine, commented: “The driver [of selection] is success rates”. 
 
A senior doctor in a private clinic added: “One of the competitive elements is success rate, inevitably, and you've got to do all that you 
possibly can to maximise your outcome and one of those, of course, is to select your patient”.  
 
The only reason why any private clinic would refuse a private patient is purely for the success rates.  They don't want these  patients to 
dilute their success rates. … What they do is they choose patients just so they are at the top.  (A nursing manager) 
 
Another senior doctor said: “Some clinics, yes, do look at a patient's history and decline to treat certain patients knowing that they're 
unlikely to become pregnant.  Other clinics, for sure, accept any patient, as long as they think there's some chance of getting a 
pregnancy”. 
 






When asked what would constitute a difficult patient, and how you would recognisze her, interviewees generally brought up the factors 
represented in our measures: “What you might say is a difficult patient, is a patient who, once you've looked at their history, you suspect 
that they're not going to have as high a chance of pregnancy as another patient who on the surface of it may seem similar”. 
 
“I know some clinics who refuse treatment based on patient age or other prognostic factors”. 
 
“So the most obvious factor is maternal age; that's the single biggest factor that affects IVF success  rate.  But there are other factors, too, 
like, for example, how many times has the patient attempted IVF in the past”. 
 
“How to turn an average clinic result into a super clinic result: You simply take out the women who have a low ovarian reserve . That's 






Table 3: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
Variable Mean S.D. Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. Success rate for standard patient group (under 35s) .254 .114 0 0.667        
2. Clinic size  457 434 1 2271 .203       
3. ICSI technology .655 .475 0 1 .501 .077      
4. Industry IVF experience 11.4 1.06 8.57 12.5 .489 .056 .729     
5. Clinic IVF experience 6.22 2.27 0 9.48 .417 .588 .473 .589    
6. Patients above the age of 35 .460 .121 0 1 .383 .146 .418 .384 .325   
7. Patients who failed before 1.16 .080 1 1.49 .118 -.098 -.067 -.088 -.099 -.103  
8. Patients who produce few eggs .784 .198 -1.83 1 .073 .087 -.056 -.011 .023 .080 .194 




Table 4: Regressions of Clinic Success Rate on the Proportion of Challenging Cases in the Patient Mix 
Variable model 1 model 2 model 3 model 4 model 5 
Clinic size (per 1000 patients)  0.110***  0.110***  0.103***  0.102***  0.106*** 
(0.030) (0.030) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) 
Clinic size – quadratic -5.06e-05*** -5.54e-05*** -5.02e-05*** -4.71e-05*** -5.29e-05*** 
(1.47e-05) (1.47e-05) (1.49e-05) (1.47e-05) (1.59e-08) 
ICSI technology   0.049***  0.040***  0.050***  0.049***  0.041*** 
(0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) 
Industry IVF experience  0.011*  0.009†  0.009†  0.012*  0.009† 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
IVF experience  0.011** -0.009 -0.034†  0.001 -0.053** 
(0.004) (0.007) (0.019) (0.007) (0.020) 
Patients above 35  -0.221*   -0.224* 
 (0.103)   (0.103) 
Patients who failed before   -0.226*  -0.192† 
  (0.107)  (0.107) 
Patients who produce few eggs    -0.024 -0.023 
   (0.037) (0.036) 
Patients above 35 
X  IVF experience 
  0.048***    0.047*** 
 (0.015)   (0.015)  
Patients who failed before  
X IVF experience 
   0.040**   0.031* 
  (0.017)  (0.017) 
Patients who produce few eggs  
X  IVF experience 
    0.012*  0.011* 
   (0.007) (0.007) 
Constant  0.005  0.117  0.279*  0.009  0.355* 
(0.049) (0.061) (0.135) (0.048) (0.144) 
Nt (total clinic-years) 1004 1004 1004 1004 1004 
N (total clinics) 105 105 105 105 105 
F statistic 67.86*** 89.94*** 65.40*** 66.01*** 44.72*** 
Clinic fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
† p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 (one-tailed tests if hypothesized; two-tailed tests otherwise); standard errors in parentheses. 
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1 To qualify for treatment in an NHS clinic women must be under 39 years of age and be 
childless. These selection criteria apply to all NHS IVF clinics and do not constitute a source 
of variation among firms.  
2 If input selection, through the learning curve, has an impact on clinic success rates rather 
than the other way around, the positively moderating impact of taking on complex cases 
should be visible also for these NHS clinics. 
3 The division by age in reporting the results is consistent across clinics. The exact ages of all 
the patients treated are unknown, so we cannot compute the mean or median, but we know 
how many of a clinic’s patients are in the below 35 year old category (the standard group) and 
how many aged over 35 years (considered more difficult cases).  
4  A minority of clinics did not offer the option of using frozen cycles throughout the entire 
period of observation. Excluding those observations (90 clinic-year observations) from the 
analysis, did not alter any of the results or models in this paper.   
5 In the field, this is considered a more controversial measure than the other two, because it is 
not impossible that obtaining a larger number of oocytes also potentially decreases their 
quality. Nevertheless, if a woman produces very few oocytes, it is generally considered a bad 
sign in terms of prognosis.  
6 The main negative effect of treating a higher proportion of older patients (> 35 years) is 
somewhat surprising, since our dependent variable is related to the success rate among 
patients aged under 35 years. Perhaps clinics that are lenient about admitting older patients 
are also more lenient toward patients with a lower ex-ante success rate for other reasons 
(unobserved in our models), which would explain the overall negative effect.   
7 Note that, on average, clinics treat 116 cases in their first year of operation. Hence, it takes 
around a year for the “low selection at the gate” clinics to catch up with the “high selection at 
the gate” organizations. 
8 When we reran models 1-5 on the 606 observations for which we have data on specialists, 
with the inclusion of the number of specialists as an additional control variable, the predictors 
patients above 35 and patients who have failed before lost their statistical significance, yet, 
patients with few eggs remained significant, both on the main term (-.36, p<.05) and in 
interaction with clinic experience (.06, p<.01). When we included the number of specialists as 
an additional control, the results were essentially identical (-.36, p<.05; .06, p<.01). This 
again strengthens the conclusion that the potential alternative explanation centered around 
specialists is not driving our results, offering further support for our theory.  
9 Running a random effects model showed that university-affiliated clinics have slightly lower 
success rates (-2.7%, p<.05), perhaps because they accept more difficult cases. An interaction 
with cumulative experience remained insignificant, suggesting that they do not learn quicker 
than others (over and above the effect of dealing with difficult cases). All estimates of our 
predictors were virtually unaffected by the inclusion of these variables.  
10 We also replicated models 2-5, including an interaction between our predictors and industry 
experience, to test whether dealing with difficult cases also enables clinics to absorb and 
benefit from the experience of others better. Yet, this appeared not to be the case; the 
interactions always were insignificant. This might be because general knowledge in the field 
also spreads effectively through other means, such as medical training, conferences, and 
literature.  
11 For an exception, see Pisano, Bohmer and Edmondson (2001) who, in a study of two 
hospitals, found that the use of various management processes (formal procedures, cross-
functional communication, feedback activities, team stability) enhanced learning. 
